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I. Introduction 
 
In the 1990s the US hospital industry consolidated. Figure 1 displays the mean 
population-weighted hospital Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the number of 
horizontal mergers, acquisitions and hospital system expansions for Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs). The average HHI increased from .1888 in 1990 to .2772 in 
2003, with the vast majority of the increase due to hospital consolidation. On average 
there were 58 hospital mergers within MSAs in any given year with the peak of the wave 
occurring in 1996 when there were 108 consolidations.1  
This paper estimates the impact of hospital consolidation on welfare. For the 
purposes of quantifying the price impact of consolidations on the under-65 population, 
hospitals are modeled as an input to the production of health insurance. In order to better 
understand the roles of upstream and downstream market structures in determining the 
impact of upstream horizontal mergers, we also make a modest contribution to the theory 
of mergers in industries that are inputs to the final consumption good.  
We examine hospital consolidations for several reasons. First, over the decade of 
the 1990s a wave of consolidation occurred but this wave was not uniform across hospital 
markets. In approximately 45% of the MSAs there was no change in market structure due 
to consolidation. Furthermore, in those markets in which a consolidation took place there 
is substantial variation in the change in market structure. Thus, the hospital industry 
provides a nice case study of the impact of horizontal mergers because we observe many 
markets with varying amounts of consolidation.  
                                                 
1 We use the term “consolidation” to refer to all combinations of previously independent organizations, e.g. 
mergers, acquisitions, consolidations and hospital system expansions.  For stylistic reasons we sometimes 
use the term “merger” to refer to the same set of combinations. 
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Second, understanding competition in the hospital industry is important in its own 
right. Inpatient hospital care comprises 31% of total US health care expenditures (Smith 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, hospitals are the second largest 3-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry in the US with over $509 billion in 
annual revenue in 2002 or 4.9% of Gross Domestic Product (NAICS Code 622, US 
Census Bureau, 2004).2 Thus, merger activity in the hospital industry not only provides 
an opportunity to test theory, but also may exert a substantial impact on aggregate 
economic activity. 
Our model predicts that horizontal mergers in upstream markets will have larger 
consequences for consumer prices, hence welfare, the more competitive the downstream 
market. That is, the fewer competitors downstream the more an upstream merger simply 
transfers monopoly rents from the downstream firms to the upstream firms.  
The hypothesis that the welfare consequences of upstream mergers are a function 
of downstream competition is supported by our empirical analysis. Hospital mergers led 
to an increase in HMO premiums for those HMOs that operated in the most competitive 
markets. However, on average, we find no effects of hospital mergers on premiums for 
HMOs that operate in markets with few competitors. Our estimates indicate that the 
aggregate impact of hospital mergers is modest but not trivial. In 2001, average HMO 
premiums are estimated to be 3.2% higher than they would have been absent any hospital 
merger activity during the 1990s. In relatively competitive HMO markets, premiums are 
5.3% higher than they would have been with no merger activity.  
Our most important finding is that these premium increases have consequences 
for the quantity and source of health insurance acquired by the under-65 year old 
                                                 
2 The largest 3-digit industry is ‘motor vehicles parts and dealers’ with $804 billion in revenues. 
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population. We match MSA-level merger information to the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) from 1990 to 2003 to analyze the impact of hospital mergers on insurance status. 
We find that hospital mergers in MSAs with relatively competitive HMO markets led to 
decreases in private health insurance and increases in the population without health 
insurance. However, in markets with weak HMO competition, hospital mergers did not 
appear to affect the amount of private health insurance coverage or the number of the 
uninsured. Hospital mergers in such markets appear to transfer rents from HMOs to 
hospitals.   
The estimated impacts of hospital mergers on private health insurance take-up and 
the uninsured population are also modest but not trivial. In 2003, we estimate that 
because of hospital mergers the likelihood of having private insurance declined by 
approximately .46 percentage points, reducing private health insurance rolls by 695,000 
lives. From 1990 to 2003, we estimate that hospital mergers resulted in a decline in 
private health insurance of 5.8 million life years.  
Our estimates indicate that the vast majority of those who exited private insurance 
joined the ranks of the uninsured. In our sample of CPS data, in 2003 the rate of 
uninsurance among 22 to 62 years olds was .178. We estimate that hospital mergers since 
1990 led to an increase in the 2003 uninsurance rate of approximately .43 percentage 
points. This translates into an extra 650,000 individuals lacking health insurance because 
of hospital consolidations that occurred over the previous 14 years. From 1990 to 2003, 
we estimate that hospital mergers increased the uninsured population by 5.5 million life-
years. 
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We use our estimates of changes in premiums and insurance take-up to calculate 
rough estimates of consumer surplus loss for adults due to hospital mergers. Between 
1990 and 2001, our estimates imply that hospital mergers resulted in a loss of consumer 
surplus of over $42.2 billion. In 2001, consumers lost over $7.3 billion surplus or 
approximately $50 per capita. While the loss of consumer surplus is substantial, the total 
welfare loss due to hospital consolidation over this period is estimated to be a modest 
$95.4 million. The reason for the much smaller dead weight loss is that, consistent with 
the previous literature, our estimates imply that the demand for health insurance is 
inelastic, the premium increase is modest and the “revenue base” for the premium 
increase (i.e. the size of the population with health insurance) is quite large.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few papers that have estimated the 
welfare consequences of horizontal mergers for consumers. There is a modest literature 
examining the effects of consummated mergers on prices, but few papers have 
documented quantity (or quality) consequences of mergers which are necessary to assess 
welfare effects. Antitrust laws have existed for over 110 years, yet there is surprisingly 
little empirical evidence on the consequences of mergers that can be used to hone 
competition policy.3  
The next section briefly summarizes the theoretical and empirical literatures on 
mergers. Section III presents a very simple model of the consequence of upstream 
mergers. Section IV discusses the empirical framework and Section V describes the data. 
Section VI presents estimation results and Section VII concludes.  
 
                                                 
3As Gurrea and Owen (2003) state: “The sad truth is that despite endless calls for empirical study of the 
effects of mergers and of antitrust enforcement of section 7, there is very little empirical evidence 
demonstrating the effects of mergers (or enjoining mergers) on consumer welfare.” 
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II. Literature 
A. Theoretical Literature 
At least since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, many economists and 
public policy makers have suspected that market power can have deleterious effects on 
markets and that mergers are one mechanism by which firms can achieve market power. 
Marshall (1920) provided an early formalized basis for this belief. However, Stigler 
(1950) noted that while mergers may increase market power, the incentives for firms to 
consolidate are mitigated by the presence of an externality. In a symmetric equilibrium, 
all non-merging firms in the market gain more from a merger than the merging parties. In 
a paper that has significantly impacted antitrust thought, Williamson (1968) showed that 
mergers that generate efficiencies, even if they create substantial market power, can be 
welfare enhancing.  
In more recent analysis, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) formalize the ideas 
of Stigler and show in a simple Cournot model that unless there are efficiencies or that 
firms achieve duopoly market power, a merger will not be privately profitable. McAfee 
and Williams (1992) Deneckere and Davidson (1985) Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell 
and Sharpiro (1990) all model the welfare consequences of privately profitable mergers 
in a static framework. A synthesis of the results from these papers is that privately 
profitable mergers can either decrease or increase welfare. Gowrisankaran (1999) models 
endogenous mergers in a dynamic framework with firm entry and exit, and he shows that 
antitrust enforcement can enhance welfare. That is, the result that mergers can reduce 
welfare is robust to dynamic considerations.  
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B. Empirical Literature 
While the theoretical literature is relatively rich and there is a very large empirical 
literature measuring the relationship between market concentration and prices, there are 
relatively few studies of the realized consequences of actual mergers on prices and 
quantities. This literature focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on three industries: 
airlines, banking, and hospitals. Borenstein (1990); Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1991) 
and Kim and Singal (1993) all find that airline mergers in the 1980s led to price 
increases. Prager and Hannan (1998) find that the deposit rates offered by banks 
operating in markets in which substantial horizontal consolidation occurred fell less than 
for banks operating in markets in which consolidation did not occur. Berger, et al. (1998) 
estimates that bank mergers led to a decline in small business lending by the merging 
institutions, which was offset as competing banks increasing their lending over time. 
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) find that Italian bank mergers initially caused consumer 
welfare to decline but over time the merging firms were able to achieve efficiencies that 
led to a long run increase in welfare. Using structural methods, Pesendorfer (2003) 
estimates the welfare impact of the wave of mergers in the paper industry during the mid-
1980s. He finds these mergers led to both static and dynamic efficiencies that yielded 
significant consumer and producer surplus gains.  
In sum, the empirical literature estimating the impact of mergers on prices and 
quantities from non-hospital industries suggests that they often lead to price increases. 
However, the works of Focarelli and Panetta (2003) and Pessendorfer (2003) are an 
important caveat to this conclusion—mergers can lead to efficiencies that benefit both 
consumers and producers. This work highlights (and expands) the empirical relevance of 
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the theoretical point Williamson (1968) made 35 years earlier. Next, we turn our attention 
to the hospital competition literature. 
Since the 1980s a large literature has evolved devoted to the impact of hospital 
competition on inpatient prices paid by insurers. Several papers have examined the 
impact of mergers on prices while a larger literature uses the cross sectional variation in 
market structure to identify the impact of competition on prices. More recently, 
researchers have estimated structural models and simulated the impact of hospital 
mergers on price. We briefly review this literature below.   
Several papers have used a pre/post research design to assess the impact of 
hospital mergers on hospital costs and the price of inpatient care paid by insurers. The 
typical finding is that mergers appear to reduce costs. Using data from 1986 to 1994, 
Connor, et al. (1997) find that hospital mergers decrease expenditures and revenues per 
admission by 4%. They interpret their results as implying that hospital mergers achieve 
significant efficiencies. Consistent with this result, Dranove and Lindrooth (2004) find 
that mergers where hospitals combine financial statements result in significant cost 
reductions. Using a very limited sample of hospital mergers, Capps and Dranove (2003) 
find that hospital consolidations led to increases in hospital prices that are greater than the 
median increase in hospital prices. Vita and Sacher (2001) analyze the impact of the 
Dominican Santa Cruz Hospital’s acquisition of its sole competitor in Santa Cruz, CA, 
AMI-Community Hospital and find that the merger led to price increases of roughly 15%. 
More recently, in an analysis that corrects for the endogeneity of mergers, Dafny (2005) 
finds that hospitals that are located within 7 miles of a merging rival raise prices by 40% 
post-merger. Finally, relying on interviews of health care executives and policymakers, 
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Devers et al. (2003) argue that hospital negotiating leverage with health insurers 
increased substantially from 1996 to 2000 and that hospital consolidation was a prime 
contributor to the increase in hospital bargaining power.   
Two papers employ structural approaches to estimate the impact of hospital 
mergers on price. Using different estimating strategies, Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and 
Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) find that hospital mergers in an urban setting 
can lead to significant price increases. Gaynor and Vogt (2003) simulate a merger in San 
Louis Obispo County that would create a monopoly and estimate that such a transaction 
would increase price by 53%. Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) simulated a 
merger between two hospitals in La Jolla, CA and predicted that it would lead to a 6% 
price increase. 
Research on the relationship between hospital concentration and prices generally 
finds that an increase in hospital concentration is correlated with higher prices for 
inpatient care, and many interpret this correlation as a causal relationship. This literature 
primarily relies on cross-sectional variation in hospital concentration to identify the 
relationship between concentration and the price paid by insurers. The source of 
identification in this approach has been criticized, but nevertheless this body of work 
provides much of the evidence on the impact of hospital competition. Comprehensive 
reviews of this literature can be found in Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) and Gaynor 
and Vogt (2000). According to Gaynor and Vogt (2000), the estimates from this literature 
imply that an increase in the HHI from .20 to .28 will lead to price changes that range 
between -3% and 17% with the average (unweighted) price increase across the estimates 
of roughly 4%.   
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In sum, the empirical literature suggests that hospital mergers in concentrated 
markets can lead to price increases for inpatient care. However, the estimated magnitudes 
of these price increases vary considerably. To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has 
been made to measure the impact of hospital mergers on the welfare of the final 
consumer.4
 
III. A Simple Theory of the Effect of Upstream Mergers 
 The literature studying the impact of non-vertical, upstream mergers on 
downstream markets is sparse.5 Given the lack of analytical results to draw upon, the 
purpose of this section is to build some theoretical guidance for our empirical 
specification. We posit the simplest model that can highlight the relationships between 
market structures and prices in two linked markets. We make many assumptions 
forsaking realism for simplicity. Specifically, we do not model that HMOs often 
selectively contract with hospitals and that HMOs and hospitals engage in bargaining 
relationships.6 We assume that the demand for HMO coverage is linear and the 
production technology for an HMO uses two inputs in fixed proportions (that is, in order 
to sell a policy an HMO must use both physician and hospital inputs in fixed 
proportions); and we assume both hospital services and HMO coverage are homogeneous 
goods.  
 We assume that there are N downstream HMOs and M upstream hospitals. The 
market for physician services is treated as perfectly competitive and thus price is set at 
                                                 
4 Several papers have examined the impact of changes in hospital concentration on the quality of care. For 
example, see Kessler and McClellan (2000).  
5 Two works that are relevant are Inderst and Wey (2003) and Blair and Harrison (1993). 
6 Ho (2006) models the formation of HMO hospital networks. 
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marginal cost. Both HMOs and hospitals are Cournot competitors, choosing output while 
taking the output choices of their competitors as given. 
 The market demand for HMO services is given by  where PPHMO = A − bQHMO HMO 
is the price of HMO services and QHMO is the market quantity of HMO services 
purchased. The cost function for a given HMO is C(qi ) = qi wα +
f
β
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  where w is the 
price of a hospital day (which is endogenous in our model), f is the price of a physician 
visit, and βα , are production function parameters. The HMO takes the prices of hospital 
and physician services as given. That is, there is no bargaining between the upstream and 
downstream firms.  
The HMO objective function is simply: 
(1)  M ax ( ) ( )
iq i
P Q q C q− i  
 
The first order conditions are: 
(2)  i
w fA bQ bq α β
⎛ ⎞− − = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Assuming HMOs are identical and a symmetric equilibrium implies that a HMO’s supply 
function and the aggregate supply function are given by:  
(3)  1
( 1)i
w fq A
b N α β
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠−  
 
and  
(4)  
( 1)i
N wQ A
b N
f
α β
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠− . 
The equilibrium HMO price is then: 
(5)   
( 1)HMO
N wP A A
N
f
α β
⎛ ⎞= − − −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠  
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From the equilibrium HMO supply function we can derive the aggregate derived demand 
for hospital days, H, as: 
(6)  
( 1)
N wH A
b N
f
α α β
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠− . 
The inverse demand for hospital days is simply: 
(7)  ( 1)b N fw A H
N
αα β
⎛ ⎞+= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
 Turning to the upstream market, hospitals take the derived demand (7) as the 
market demand for their output. The hospital’s objective function is: 
(8)   M ax ( ) ( )
ih i
w H h C h− i
The first-order conditions, after substituting in the derived demand, are: 
(9) 
2( 1) ( 1)
i h
b N f b NA H h
N N
α αα β
⎛ ⎞+ +− − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ mc= . 
Assuming a symmetric Nash equilibrium gives the individual and market supply curves 
for hospital services:   
 
(10)  
( )( 1)
h
i
mcN fh A
M N bα α β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ −  
and 
(11)  
( )( 1)
hmcNM fH A
M N bα α β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ −  
 
Substitution into market derived demand yields: 
(12)  
( )
M mc f fw A A
M
α α α α β β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
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Substituting back into the HMO inverse demand gives the HMO price as a function of the 
HMO and hospital market structure: 
(13)  
( 1) ( )HMO
N M mc fP A A
N M
α
α α β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
 The downstream equilibrium price is a function of the product of the upstream 
and downstream market structures. In this framework, the impact of a hospital merger on 
HMO prices and thus welfare depends not only on the hospital market structure but on 
the HMO market structure as well. Specifically, 
(14)  
2
1 ( 1) ( )( 1 )
HMO
M
P N mA
M N M M
α c f
α α αΔ =−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Δ = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟Δ + + − + ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠β
−
                                                
. 
Given our assumptions, as the HMO market becomes more competitive, the impact of a 
given hospital consolidation on HMO prices increases.7 That is, while total welfare will 
be lower when the HMO market is more consolidated (there is double marginalization), 
the change in welfare from the marginal merger will be lower when the HMO market is 
more concentrated. This is the key insight from this highly stylized theory that we use to 
guide the data analysis. The impact of hospital mergers on welfare is a function of the 
interaction of HMO and hospital market structure.  
 
IV. Empirical Framework 
We are interested in estimating the impact of hospital mergers on HMO premiums 
and the quantity of health insurance purchased. We use two units of analysis. First, the 
 
7 This result is sensitive to the assumptions about the functional form of demand. In a constant elasticity of 
demand framework, as the HMO market becomes more competitive, the impact of a given hospital 
consolidation on HMO prices decreases. However, as we discuss below, the implication of the model using 
a linear demand framework is the one that turns out to be empirically relevant.  
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impact of hospital mergers on HMO premiums is examined with the HMO as the unit of 
analysis. Second, the impact of hospital mergers on health insurance purchase is 
examined with the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) or Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) as the unit of analysis.8 The primary data source for hospital 
consolidations is the American Hospital Association (AHA). Information on 
consolidations is merged with HMO level data for the first analysis and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data at the MSA level for the second analysis.  
A. HMO Premiums 
To investigate the impact of hospital consolidations on HMO premiums we 
estimate parameters from the following HMO-level regression:  
(15) 
2001
1 2
1991
log log logjt j jt jt jt t t jt
t
p MergerHHI NHMO X yearμ α α β φ
=
= + + + + +∑ ε  
where  is the average premium charged by HMO j across all of the markets it 
participates in period t, 
ijp
jtMergerHHI is the enrollment-weighted average hospital 
“merger” Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. We discuss the “merger” component of the 
construction of this variable below. is the population-weighted average number 
of HMOs operating in the Health Services Area (HSA) over all the counties served by the 
HMO, X
ijNHMO
jt are variables that measure the characteristics of the HMO that may impact its 
costs and product quality and average characteristics of the markets it serves that may 
impact its costs and/or the market demand. The variable yeart is an annual dummy 
variable—our HMO data span the period 1990 to 2001. The HMO-specific error term, 
jμ may be correlated with the right hand side variables and in particular jtMergerHHI  
                                                 
8 We refer to PMSA and MSAs generically as MSAs. 
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and . Since some unobserved characteristics of HMO pricing behavior may be 
correlated with their propensity to experience hospital mergers or the amount of direct 
competition they face, we estimate the parameters of (15) using a standard fixed-effects 
estimator. To calculate consistent standard errors in the presence of auto-correlated 
residuals we bootstrap the estimates.  
ijNHMO
We use HMOs as the downstream seller of health insurance and the number of 
HMOs as the measure of health insurance market structure; however, there are a number 
of possible measures of health insurance and of market structure, so our choices deserve 
justification. We focus on HMOs as opposed to all possible forms of health insurance 
because information on HMOs is available at the MSA level while information on the 
number of other types of insurers is available only at the state level. The lack of data on 
other forms of health insurers should not affect our results. Through the use of selective 
contracting HMOs are the health insurance organizational form that generates the greatest 
hospital price sensitivity — the rise of HMOs is credited with introducing price 
competition into the market for hospital services (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). Thus, the 
number of HMOs (or some other indicator of HMO market structure) is likely a better 
measure of the degree of price competition hospitals face than the total number of health 
insurers.  
We measure HMO market structure using the number of independent 
organizations as opposed to a HHI index as we can count this with little error. Calculating 
14 
a HHI requires assumptions regarding the distribution of enrollees over a HMO’s service 
area and likely can only be measured with non-trivial error.9
 The theory outlined above suggests that the impact of a change in the number of 
hospitals on HMO prices will be a function of HMO market structure. To capture this 
possibility we split the data in three different samples based on the 1995 mean value 
of . The cut-offs are chosen so that they roughly correspond to thirds of the CPS 
data sample. The samples are zero to six HMOs, seven to nine HMOs, and ten or greater 
HMOs. The theory of the previous section suggests that in the most competitive HMO 
markets, the coefficient on 
ijNHMO
jtMergerHHI  should be positive—an increase in hospital 
market concentration should increase HMO premiums in those markets. 
B. Health Insurance  
We estimate the impact of mergers on the probability than an individual will have 
private and any health insurance a using a linear probability model. Letting Iimt denote the 
insurance status indicator for individual i in MSA m in period t we estimate parameters 
from the following equation: 
(16) 
2003
1 2
1991
lnimt m mt mt imt t t imt
t
I MergerHHI NHMO W yearλ φ φ δ γ
=
= + + + + +∑ ν , 
where λm  is an MSA fixed effect, NHMOmt is the number of HMOs operating in the 
MSA, Wimt is a vector that includes a rich set of individual demographic controls and 
MSA-level characteristics and vmt is the residual. The parameter 1φ  measures the impact 
of hospital mergers on the likelihood of insurance take-up and is the parameter of primary 
interest. 
                                                 
9 To test the robustness of our results to different specifications, we included an HMO HHI Index in the 
premium regression. The results of this estimation are qualitatively identical to those we present here.   
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As in the HMO premium analysis, we follow the theory by estimating the 
parameters of (16) separately for three different samples, split roughly by thirds of the 
population-weighted number of HMOs in 1995.10 The samples are zero to six HMOs, 
seven to nine HMOs, and ten or greater HMOs.  
C. Hospital Market Structure and Mergers  
 Our main right-hand-side variable of interest in both empirical specifications 
is mtMergerHHI which measures the accumulated change in hospital bed-based 
concentration solely due to consolidation. The advantage of using this measure over the 
more common HHI is that the standard HHI is more prone to endogeneity even 
controlling for location fixed effects. For example, hospital exits and changes in the 
distribution of beds are likely correlated with changes in hospital demand and those 
changes, in turn, may be related to shocks in insurance coverage. Of course, changes in 
mtMergerHHI  could be correlated with unobserved insurance shocks, but, as we discuss 
below, the evidence we can bring to bear suggests changes in jtMergerHHI are 
exogenous. 
At the market level, MergerHHI is calculated by taking the market shares of 
hospital physical plants in 1990 and then assigning those hospitals to the organization to 
which they belong in year t. Letting  denote the market share based on the staffed 
bed size of organization m in 1990,  
sm,1990
(12)  21990
1
( )
M
mt m mt
m
MergerHHI s O
=
= ∑
                                                 
10 We explored using different years to define the three different samples. The qualitative results are 
unaffected by the choice of years used to define the samples.  
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where Omt is the ownership/system structure of hospitals in period t. While mtMergerHHI  
is highly correlated with the traditional HHI, the change in mtMergerHHI  over time is 
solely due to changes in ownership and hospital system structure. This measure treats 
exiting hospitals as remaining in the market and does not include new entrants in the 
measure of concentration. The vast majority of the change in the standard HHI in our data 
is due to mergers. Thus, while we think it useful to separate changes in the HHI due to 
consolidation, our results are robust to using a standard HHI measure.11   
D. Identification 
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission were not passive 
observers of the hospital merger wave in the 1990s. Both agencies brought several suits 
attempting to enjoin hospital mergers and in each case the courts sided with the hospitals. 
The courts’ rulings effectively implied that hospital were to be held to a more lenient 
antitrust standard than other industries (Greaney, 2002).12 In fact, the antitrust agencies’ 
failure in court may have precipitated the merger wave. Because of the reduced antitrust 
scrutiny hospital mergers enjoyed over this period, our sample of hospital mergers is not 
a selected sample of transactions that would typically need to pass traditional antitrust 
scrutiny. That is, the hospital industry over this period serves as an experiment of the 
welfare consequences of significantly reduced antitrust oversight. 
 Our key identifying assumption is that ε jt  and imtυ  are uncorrelated with 
MergerHHI  in the HMO premium and health insurance analysis, respectively. It is 
                                                 
11 We considered using Merge rHHI as an instrument for the standard HHI measure in an instrumental 
variables regression and our qualitative conclusions are robust to this specification.  
12 This string of losses was recently reversed in a case brought by the Federal Trade Commission. In FTC v. 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation (2005) (File No. 011 0234, Docket No. 9315) the Court 
ruled in favor of the FTC and ordered previously consolidated hospitals to de-merge. This case is currently 
under appeal. 
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reasonable to ask under what other scenarios the shocks to HMO premiums,ε jt , and the 
shocks to health insurance status, imtυ , are correlated with jtMergerHHI  and how likely 
are those scenarios?   
In the HMO analysis, positive HMO demand shocks mean the potential rents a 
hospital can extract via merger have increased and may overcome any transaction costs. 
However, hospital mergers are very complex transactions taking years to initiate, 
negotiate and complete and inherently embody significant uncertainty over the time to 
completion. It would be very difficult for these organizations to forecast demand shocks 
and time their merger to take advantage of those shocks. However, if these shocks are not 
independent over time, then it plausible they could be correlated with jtMergerHHI . If 
this were the case, we should expect jtMergerHHI to be correlated with other, more easily 
observed, demand and cost side variables. Also, if the shocks are foreseeable and unless 
hospitals can accurately time the consummation of their transaction, then leads and lags 
of jtMergerHHI should be correlated with HMO premium. This logic suggests that 
another indirect test of our specification is to estimate the model with leading and lagged 
values of jtMergerHHI . 
We estimated a fixed-effects regression of HMO-level demand (average HMO 
penetration, average logarithm of population, average size distribution of firms, number 
of physicians, percent Medicare, percent Medicaid, and nurses’ wages) on jtMergerHHI . 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that hospital consolidations are 
uncorrelated with HMO demand and cost shifts. None of the coefficients on demand and 
cost variables were significant at traditional levels of confidence. That is, jtMergerHHI is 
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uncorrelated with the observable measures of demand and costs. This provides some 
indirect evidence that jtMergerHHI  is exogenous.  
In addition, we estimated the coefficients in (15) including leading and lagged 
values of jtMergerHHI to test whether there are premium shocks that are autocorrelated 
with jtMergerHHI but are unrelated to hospital merger activity. In all specifications the 
coefficients on the leading and lagged values of jtMergerHHI are insignificant. This 
suggests that any endogeneity that would confound our findings must be 
contemporaneous with the merger activity and that strikes us as unlikely.   
Likewise in the insurance take-up analysis, identification of the impact of hospital 
mergers comes from within-MSA variation in hospital merger activity. While we control 
for time-invariant, unobserved differences across MSAs and we include a rich set of 
demographic and geographic controls, it is nevertheless reasonable to ask 
if mtMergerHHI is correlated with shocks to health insurance status. For example, a 
possible source of endogeneity is that markets that experience other disruptions that 
affect insurance status also experience more merger activity.  
While such endogeneity is plausible, we found little indirect evidence for it. For 
example, observable demand proxies do not appear to be correlated with mtMergerHHI . 
Town, et al. (2005) found little correlation between the level of hospital merger activity 
and any inpatient demand variable. Interestingly, the level of merger activity is uniformly 
distributed across the major geographic regions. Importantly, they did not find an 
association between HMO penetration and hospital merger activity.  
19 
As in the premium analysis, we can test for the presence of factors that are 
autocorrelated with MSA merger activity by adding leads and lags of mtMergerHHI  to the 
regression.13 As long as these unobservable shocks are not coincident with mtMergerHHI , 
a prospect we believe is unlikely, the indirect tests of exogeneity of mtMergerHHI  are 
consistent with that hypothesis.  
Finally, our theory predicts that hospital merger activity should impact 
unconcentrated HMO markets more than concentrated ones, and part of our identification 
strategy is to compare the impact of hospital mergers in concentrated HMO markets with 
unconcentrated markets. For endogeneity to impact our conclusions the error terms in the 
analysis would have to be correlated with mtMergerHHI  only in some markets but not in 
other markets.  
Given that we believe that mtMergerHHI is exogenous in our analysis, it is an open 
question of why some areas experienced significantly more hospital merger activity than 
other areas. The literature has found that the role and influence of business consultants, 
which differ significantly across hospitals, is associated with consolidation strategies 
(APM/University Health System Consortium (1995); Burns and Pauly (2002); Bazzoli, 
LoSasso, Arnould, and Shalowitz (2002); Burns, L.R., Bazzoli, G.J., Dynan, L. and 
Wholey, D.R. (1997)). If the use of consultants is driven by management styles and those 
styles are unrelated to other supply or demand shocks, it provides an account of the 
variation in merger activity that is exogenous in our empirical specifications. 
                                                 
13 One possibility is that a decline in the percentage of the population that has private health insurance leads 
to a decline in hospital demand and that provides an incentive for future hospital mergers in response to the 
decline in demand. From conception to completion, hospital mergers take a significant amount of time (a 
minimum of 2 years), thus unless hospitals can forecast these demand declines and organize a consolidation 
response to them, hospital consolidation would occur in response to a contemporaneous shift in demand.  
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 V. Data 
 Our data come from three primary sources: The American Hospital Association 
(AHA) Annual Survey, InterStudy, and the Current Population Survey. These data are 
supplemented with information on location characteristics that are available from the 
Census Bureau and the Area Resource File.  
A. American Hospital Association Data 
 The AHA collects information on location, characteristics and ownership of over 
95% of hospitals with 300 or more beds. We use annual data from 1990 to 2003, from 
which we define a sample of private (i.e. non-government), short-term, acute care, 
general medical and/or surgical hospitals. Psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals are 
excluded from the analysis. Of particular interest is the AHA’s list of hospital mergers 
which we use, along with the information on system change, to formulate our measures 
of ownership structure. The AHA tracks hospital system affiliation and records 
consolidation between hospitals if one hospital joins the system in which the other 
hospital is a member. A consolidation can also occur if a hospital is deleted from the 
AHA data and is listed as merging with another hospital. We use a “corrected” AHA 
system ID constructed by Kristin Madison which has been updated by researchers at 
Carnegie Mellon University.14  
B. InterStudy Data 
 The population of HMOs is specified using data from the InterStudy Census 
(InterStudy, 1985-1987; InterStudy, 1988-2001) and the Group Health Association of 
                                                 
14 We thank Kristin Madison, Marty Gaynor and colleagues for providing us with this data. See Madison 
(2004) for more information on this data. 
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America (GHAA) HMO Directories. InterStudy and GHAA also are the sources for HMO 
location, founding year, model type, not-for-profit status, federal qualification, national 
affiliation, counties where the HMO operates, and enrollment information. The financial 
data used to measure commercial premiums come from annual reports filed with state 
regulators that have been collected by different organizations.  
 Into the HMO data we merged county-level market measures from the Area 
Resource File (ARF) compiled by the Bureau of Health Professions of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services. State-level wage data came from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. We obtained these reports and 
surveys and linked them together. The method of aggregating data to the HMO level is 
described in Town, Wholey and Feldman (2004).  
 Premiums are calculated as total premium revenue divided by total member 
months for commercial products. The market boundaries used to calculate 
are Health Services Areas (HSAs) (Makuc et al., 1991). A HSA is defined 
as one or more counties that are relatively self-contained with respect to the provision of 
routine hospital care. We then formulate the HMO level value of for each 
HMO in each period by taking a weighted average of the estimated HMO enrollment (as 
defined below) over the HSAs where it operates.  
jtMergerHHI
jtMergerHHI
 In the HMO premium regressions we include a broad set of variables formulated 
from the InterStudy/GHAA/ARF data. These variables control for HMO and market-
level characteristics that may be correlated with premiums and jtMergerHHI . The list of 
control variables is provided in Table A1. 
22 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for many of the variables used in the premium 
analysis.  Premiums rose modestly over the decade from an average $123 per member per 
month in 1990 to $145 in 2000. Concordantly, the rose substantially from 
.1686 in 1990 to .1886 in 2000, while there was little net change in average number of 
HMO competitors.
jtMergerHHI
15 There was also a significant change in the distribution of HMO 
organizational forms over the decade. Network HMOs, Independent Practice 
Organizations (IPAs) and group HMOs declined, while “Mixed” forms increased 
substantially.16 There was also a decrease in the percentage of not-for-profit HMOs from 
70% in 1990 to 66% in 2000.17 The percentage of enrollees from the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs grew substantially over the decade. By 2000, on average, they 
accounted for 6.7 and 9.6 percent of HMO enrollees, respectively.18
C. Current Population Survey Data 
To study the impact of hospital mergers on insurance take-up, we analyze data 
from the March Supplement of the CPS from 1990 to 2003. The CPS is a large, 
nationally representative survey of households. We limit our analysis to civilian adults 
between the ages of 22 and 62 because the inclusion of the younger population introduces 
the possibility that the Medicaid expansions may confound our estimates.19 The CPS 
provides information on whether an individual had health insurance from any source, 
whether an individual had health insurance from a non-government source, age, race, 
                                                 
15 Over this period there was significant HMO entry. However, HMO consolidation apparently had an off-
setting impact on HMO concentration. 
16 These shifts suggest that premium trends may be associated with the organizational forms. In the analysis 
of HMO premiums we control for this possibility using organizational form-specific time trends as well as 
for-profit status time trends. 
17 Town, Wholey and Feldman (2004) find that HMO for-profit status conversions had little effect on 
premiums.  
18 We do not have data for the number of Medicare and Medicaid enrollees by HMO for 1990. 
19 Of course, many adults in our sample may qualify for Medicaid coverage.  
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ethnicity, education, family size, household income, employment status, and the 
employer size.  
In 2000, the Census Bureau implemented significant changes in the CPS. The 
most important for our purposes is a change in the health insurance questions. Prior to 
2000, the Census Bureau used a “residual” approach to classify health insurance coverage 
(Davern et al., 2003). The surveyors asked several yes/no questions about the types of 
health insurance coverage held by the respondent. If the respondent answered “no” to all 
the questions they were assumed not to have health insurance. In 2000, the survey was 
modified to verify whether the person who answered “no” to all questions, in fact, did not 
have health insurance. Approximately 8.1 percent of the 2001 respondents who did not 
answer “yes” to the standard health insurance questions reported actually being insured 
when asked. We recoded the 2000-2003 data so that it is consistent with earlier surveys.20
We treat the relevant market for hospital services as the Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA) because this is the smallest geographic unit in the CPS that we can merge 
with the hospital consolidation data. We used the MSA code to match the individual 
information to information on hospital and from the AHA and InterStudy 
data. All AHA and InterStudy data are aggregated to the MSA level.  
mtMergerHHI
The MSA is not the ideal geographic market definition for the CPS analysis 
because the geo-political boundaries of MSAs are not necessarily related to hospital 
market boundaries. To address this problem we limit our sample to MSAs between 
100,000 and 4,500,000 in 1990 population. The lower bound on the size of the MSA was 
chosen because small MSAs may be too narrow to define hospital markets.  Practically 
                                                 
20 This correction affects the magnitudes and precision of our estimates but not the qualitative conclusions. 
See www.shadac.org for an algorithm to implement this correction.  
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speaking, we also found few CPS observations from MSAs less than 100,000 in 
population. An upper bound was selected because in large cities the MSA likely 
overstates the boundary of the hospital market potentially introducing significant 
measurement error in .mtMergerHHI
21 Observations that were not in an MSA were not 
used to estimate the coefficients but are used in assessing the impact of hospital mergers 
on welfare. 
Instead of treating MSAs as markets, we would like to define the geographic 
market boundaries using patient hospital choice information as in Kessler and McClellan 
(2000). However, that exercise would require more detailed information on the location 
of a household than is available in the CPS. Kessler and McClellan (2000) compared 
their data-driven Herfindahl measures to Herfindahl indexes derived using a fixed circle 
about the hospital to define markets and found conclusions regarding the impact of 
competition were sensitive to how the concentration measures were formed. Because our 
market definition is significantly different from the definition Kessler and McClellan 
used to formulate their comparison HHI measure, the specific implication of their 
findings for our results is unclear. But, we have attempted to assess the impact of 
measurement error by estimating a model interacting  with market size. The 
idea is that if there is measurement error it is likely correlated with market size. Our 
conclusions are robust to this specification. Nevertheless, the Kessler and McClellan 
research results point out a limitation of our work – the possibility of measurement error 
in market boundaries that translates into measurement error in the calculation 
 over time. 
mtMergerHHI
mtMergerHHI
                                                 
21 Again, our results are robust to a number of different thresholds and the exclusion of any thresholds.  
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A list of control variables used in the analysis of insurance take-up is provided in 
Table A1. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the CPS sample. The percentage of 
individuals with private health insurance declined by two percentage points over the 
decade and the percentage of individuals with any health insurance declined by three 
percentage points. As in the HMO data, hospital concentration increased substantially 
due to mergers. Over the decade the average  increased to .2783 from an 
initial level of .1909. Except for Hispanic status (which increased 10 percentage points), 
most of the demographic variables were relatively constant over the sample period.   
mtMergerHHI
 
VI. Results 
A. Impact of Hospital Mergers on HMO Premiums 
Table 3 presents the fixed-effects regression coefficients of the logarithm of 
average HMO premiums on the logarithms of average jtMergerHHI and the average 
number of HMOs. In the full sample, the coefficients on both jtMergerHHI  and 
logarithm of  are small and not significantly different from zero at traditional 
levels of confidence.  
NHMO
The second column of Table 3 presents the estimates from the sample of HMOs 
whose average is greater than or equal to ten. The coefficient onNHMO jtMergerHHI is 
positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.83). For the other two HMO samples the estimated 
coefficients on jtMergerHHI are small in magnitude and insignificant at traditional levels 
of confidence. These results suggest that in less competitive HMO markets hospital 
mergers redistribute market power rents between hospitals and HMOs and may not have 
any impact of social welfare.  
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For HMOs that, on average, appear to face substantial competition, the coefficient 
estimates imply an HMO premium elasticity of mtMergerHHI of .085. This estimate 
implies that an increase in the average mtMergerHHI from .20 to .28 (this is the “standard 
hospital merger” in Gaynor and Vogt (2000)) will increase average premiums by 
approximately 2.9%. We can translate this premium increase into an implied increase in 
the price of inpatient care. Hospital expenditures comprise about 30% of HMO 
expenditures and if we assume a fixed-proportions technology and a 100% premium 
pass-through, our estimate suggests that an increase in the average mtMergerHHI from .20 
to .28 raised the average price of inpatient hospital services by approximately 10%. This 
estimate is in the heart of the distribution of estimated price increases from the literature 
on hospital competition discussed in Section II.   
B. Impact of Hospital Mergers on Health Insurance Consumers 
 If hospital mergers raise the price of inpatient care, then they should affect the 
quantity of health insurance consumed by consumers. We explore that possibility in this 
section. As discussed above, we divide the merged CPS data into samples roughly 
corresponding to thirds of the population-weighted, 1995 number of HMOs in an MSA. 
Again, those samples are zero to six, seven to nine, and ten or greater HMOs. 
Table 4 presents fixed-effects estimates of the likelihood of civilian adults having 
private health insurance by degree of HMO competition. The first column of Table 4 
presents the results from the entire sample. The coefficient of mtMergerHHI is negative, 
small in magnitude and insignificant and the coefficient of the logarithm of the number of 
HMOs is positive but not significant at traditional levels of confidence.  
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 Column (2) of Table 4 presents the estimate of the impact of hospital mergers on 
the probability of having private health insurance for adults living in MSAs in the most 
competitive HMO markets. The coefficient of mtMergerHHI is negative, large in 
magnitude and significant at the 5% level of confidence (absolute value of t-statistic = 
3.27). That is, hospital mergers in these MSAs are estimated to reduce the amount of 
health insurance purchased from private sources. The coefficient estimates imply that a 
hospital merger that an increase in mtMergerHHI from .20 to .28 reduces the likelihood of 
having private insurance by .013. Using the estimates of the premium impacts from 
hospital mergers presented above in combination with these estimates implies a private 
insurance semi-elasticity (
Premium%
Insurance Private Prob
Δ
Δ ) of -.45, which is in the middle of the 
range of estimates from the literature. For example, at the high end of the spectrum 
Gruber and Poterba (1994) estimate a semi-elasticity of demand for health insurance for 
the self-employed of -1.8. At the low end Chernew, Cutler and Keenan (2005) estimate 
the insurance semi-elasticity for private insurance to be -.10. 
 Table 5 presents the fixed-effects estimates of the likelihood of civilian adults 
having health insurance from any source by the degree of HMO competition. The 
patterns of coefficient estimates are similar to those presented in Table 4. In column (2) 
of Table 5 the coefficient of mtMergerHHI for MSAs with ten or more HMOs in 1995 is -
.15 and is precisely estimated (absolute value of t-statistic = 2.54). Interestingly, this 
coefficient is similar to the corresponding coefficient in Table 4. This result, along with 
the results in Table 4, suggests that the vast majority individuals who drop private 
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insurance because of a premium increase become uninsured. The coefficient estimates of 
mtMergerHHI  for the other MSA samples are small and insignificant. 
 The results of Table 3, 4 and 5 suggest that hospital mergers lead to increases in 
health insurance premiums in competitive HMO markets, and the increases in HMO 
premiums lead to a decline in private health insurance take-up and an increase in the 
uninsurance rate. If hospital mergers cause health insurance premiums to increase, for a 
number of reasons we should expect poorer individuals to be more sensitive to premium 
increases and thus more affected by hospital mergers in competitive HMO markets. To 
test this hypothesis, we formulate two samples from the CPS based on household income 
and estimate the impact of hospital mergers on the likelihood that those living in MSAs 
with competitive HMO markets possess private health insurance or any health insurance 
at all. The first group comprises individuals with household income under $60,000, and 
the second group is individuals with household income above $60,000.  
 Table 6 presents the results of this exercise. The coefficient estimates indicate that 
hospital mergers reduced the likelihood of acquiring private insurance for the low-income 
group. In column (1), the coefficient on mtMergerHHI is -.22 and significant at the 5% 
level. For the upper-income sample (column (2)) hospital mergers did not significantly 
affect the likelihood of private insurance take-up. This pattern also holds when the 
dependent variable is the presence of any insurance. The coefficient on mtMergerHHI is -
.20 and the absolute value of the t-statistic is 2.53. The results in Table 6 are consistent 
with hospital mergers leading to higher health insurance premiums in unconcentrated 
HMO markets, with the impact of the premium increases on insurance take-up limited to 
the poorer half of the income distribution.      
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C. Robustness 
  Table 7 presents the most important of many robustness checks we performed on 
these analyses. The most obvious concern is that mtMergerHHI is endogenous. That is, 
unobserved shocks to insurance may drive hospital mergers. To test this possibility we 
included two-year leads and lags of mtMergerHHI as additional right-hand side variables. 
The logic underlying this test is that unobserved trends in insurance may be correlated 
with hospital mergers but this correlation is unlikely to be contemporaneous. So 
if mtMergerHHI is endogenous, a marker would be correlation between the leading or 
lagged values and insurance take-up. In addition, if hospital consolidation ultimately 
leads to efficiencies that are passed on in the form of lower prices but those efficiencies 
take some time to realize then coefficients of the lagged values of mtMergerHHI  should 
be positive.  
 The first column in Table 7 presents the results with inclusion of the two-year 
leading and lagged values of mtMergerHHI . In this specification, mtMergerHHI  is 
negative and significant at the 1% level while the coefficients of both the lead and lag 
values mtMergerHHI are small in magnitude and insignificant.
22 These results suggest that 
endogeneity is not an issue. Furthermore, the results do not indicate that hospitals are able 
to achieve efficiencies through merger over time and pass them on to consumers in the 
form of lower health insurance premiums.  
                                                 
22 In a regression of health insurance status on contemporaneous, one and two-year lagged values of 
mtMergerHHI , the coefficients on the lagged values of mtMergerHHI are small and insignificant while the 
coefficient on contemporaneous 
mtMergerHHI is large. This suggests that our results are robust to potential 
measurement differences in the reported time of insurance status and hospital consolidation.   
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 Columns (2) – (5) of Table 7 present the results using different HMO 
concentration cut-off values to define the most competitive HMO markets. Consistent 
with our theory, the coefficient on mtMergerHHI  declines as the threshold on the number 
of HMOs decreases. Above eight HMOs the coefficient becomes insignificant in the 
private health insurance take-up regression, while the coefficient becomes insignificant 
above nine HMOs in the regression for any health insurance.  
We re-estimated the coefficients on the sample that excluded the years 1990-
1992, 1994-1996, and 1998-2000.  The coefficient estimates and standard errors were not 
meaningfully different than those presented in Tables 3 and 4. We also dropped MSAs 
with very large and very small changes in the private health insurance rate to see if our 
estimates are sensitive to outliers. Again, the coefficients and standard error estimates 
from this analysis are in line with results present above. 
We estimated the model using different definitions of the hospital organizational 
boundary. Specifically, we define an organization as one that generates one financial 
report in the AHA data. Dranove and Lindrooth (2004) found that hospital mergers where 
the newly formed organization consolidated its financial reports generated significant 
cost reductions. These results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. Consistent with 
the results of Dranove and Lindrooth (2004), changes in hospital concentration using this 
definition of the hospital organization did not impact health insurance take-up.   
D. The Welfare Impact of Hospital Mergers 1990 -2003  
Table 8 shows the effect of an implied increase in HMO premiums due to hospital 
consolidations from 1990 onwards. Premium increases as a consequence of hospital 
consolidation were very modest until the late 1990s but by 2001, the last year for which 
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we have premium data, our estimates imply that HMO premiums were 3.2% higher than 
they would have been absent horizontal hospital consolidation.  
Table 9 examines the impact of hospital consolidation on health insurance take-up 
rates. By the late 1990s, hospital mergers had a modest but non-trivial impact on health 
insurance take-up. In 2003, the rate of private insurance is estimated to be .0046 lower 
because of hospital consolidation, while the uninsurance rate is estimated to be .0043 
higher. This translates into approximately 695,000 (.5%) fewer covered lives in private 
health insurance with most of these (650,000) joining the ranks of the uninsured. Over the 
entire 14 years of our sample, we estimate that private insurance decreased by 5.9 million 
covered life-years and uninsurance increased by 5.5 million covered life-years.  
Using the estimates from Tables 8 and 9 we can calculate rough, back-of-the- 
envelope estimates of the welfare loss (and the decomposition of that loss) from hospital 
consolidations during our study time period. We estimate the change in consumer surplus 
and the dead weight loss in the simplest possible way – we assume a linear demand 
function and constant marginal cost. There are numerous limitations associated with this 
exercise. We do not account for heterogeneity in preferences and in health insurance plan 
structures. We also assume that the premium increases due to hospital mergers we 
estimate for HMOs apply to all forms of private health insurance. We do not account for 
the possibility that hospital mergers may result in efficiencies that can increase hospital 
profits.23 We also are not taking into account the impact of hospital mergers on the use of 
inpatient services by either the insured or uninsured or the structure of insurers hospital 
                                                 
23 Dranove and Lindrooth (2004) estimate that hospital mergers in which the hospitals consolidate their 
financial statements result in cost reductions of approximately 14%. 
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networks.24 Finally, we consider only the net decline in insurance coverage – those 
people who lost private coverage but gained public coverage are not considered to have 
lost any consumer surplus.  
Table 10 presents these calculations. Recall that our sample is civilian adults 
between ages 22 and 62.  By 2001, hospital consolidations reduced consumer surplus for 
this sample by $7.4 billion (about 2.8% of total private insurance revenues) or $49.82 per 
capita. From 1990 to 2001, total consumer surplus was reduced by $42.2 billion. Total 
welfare loss was quite modest, however. By 2001, net welfare loss from horizontal 
hospital consolidations was a mere $19.7 million and the total net welfare loss from 1990 
to 2001 was $95.7 million. That is, it appears that the primary impact of hospital mergers 
was to transfer consumer surplus to hospitals. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
The hospital industry enjoyed reduced antitrust scrutiny while it consolidated in 
the 1990s. Our work suggests that hospital consolidation resulted in non-trivial 
consequences for health insurance consumers. Hospital consolidation caused private 
insurance rolls to decrease and the number of US residents without health insurance to 
increase. Thus, if the goal of antitrust policy is to prevent consolidations that reduce 
consumer surplus independent of the impact on profits, then during the 1990s the courts’ 
rulings on hospital mergers ran counter to this goal. Currently, the Federal Trade 
                                                 
24 It is possible that insurers react to increased hospital prices by increasing inpatient co-pays and that, in 
turn, would impact enrollee welfare. We are not in possession of the data to explore this possibility. 
However, our results suggest that the majority of the changes in hospital prices are passed along in the form 
of premium increases in competitive HMO markets. Ho (2006) has analyzed the impact of restricted 
hospital network choice on health insurance beneficiaries and finds that selective contracting leads to $1 
billion in societal welfare loss across 43 metropolitan areas. Estimating the impact of hospital mergers on 
HMO network structure is a formidable task and beyond the scope of this paper. Ho (2005) has made some 
progress on this problem. 
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Commission is reviewing and in some cases challenging consummated hospital 
consolidations. Our work suggests that such challenges may be justified. However, if the 
purpose of antitrust policy is to prohibit only those mergers that reduce total welfare, a 
view with which many economists concur, then our results suggest that the courts were 
correct in their assessment of the impact of hospital mergers. There was very little 
welfare loss from hospital consolidations during the 1990s.  
Our work also makes a modest contribution to merger analysis when the merging 
firms are upstream from the final product. The important point we make there is that the 
impact of an upstream merger on the final consumers is a function of the downstream 
market structure.  
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 Table 1 
 
Summary statistics of HMO estimation sample 
 
Year 
Variable Full Sample 
1990 1995 2001 
HMO Premium 
(2000 dollars) 
$133.62 
(26.86) 
$122.62 
(24.74) 
$136.20 
(26.73) 
$145.55 
(26.70) 
jtMergerHHI  
.1766 
(.1092) 
.1686 
(.976) 
.1710 
(.111) 
.1868 
(.1157) 
Average Number 
of HMOs  
9.39 
(4.17) 
8.91 
(5.05) 
9.38 
(3.86) 
8.26 
(2.77) 
Enrollment 127,941 (243,889) 
73,806 
(164,190) 
111,744 
(204,271) 
212,024 
(360,957) 
Age in Years 12.6 (8.73) 
8.6 
(7.6) 
12.1 
(8.5) 
17.3 
(9.07) 
Percent For-Profit 68.5 66.4 69.7 70.7 
Percent Network 
HMO 9.3 13.8 8.3 10.9 
Percent IPA HMO 58.3 65.4 59.3 50.9 
Percent Group 
HMO 6.4 10.4 6.8 2.6 
Percent Staff 
HMO 4.4 8.5 3.4 1.1 
Mixed HMO 21.7 1.9 22.1 34.5 
Percent 
Enrollment 
Medicare 
4.3 -- 3.6 6.7 
Percent 
Enrollment  
Medicaid 
6.4 -- 5.6 9.6 
N 3,340 318 350 267 
Note: Means are not weighted by enrollment
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Table 2 
 
Summary statistics of CPS sample  
Means and standard deviations in parentheses 
 
Year Variable All Years 1990 1997 2003 
Private Health 
Insurance 
.80 
(.40) 
.81 
(.38) 
.80 
(.40) 
.80 
(.40) 
Any Health 
Insurance 
.82 
(.39) 
.82 
(.38) 
.82 
(.39) 
.83 
(.34) 
Age 39.4 (10.4) 
38.2 
(10.5) 
39.5 
(10.3) 
40.4 
(10.2) 
Female .46 (.50) 
.45 
(.50) 
.47 
(.50) 
.47 
(.50) 
Married .64 (.48) 
.64 
(.48) 
.64 
(.48) 
.65 
(.48) 
White  .86 (.35) 
.87 
(.33) 
.86 
(.34) 
.83 
(.37) 
Black .089 (.28) 
.084 
(.28) 
.086 
(.28) 
.099 
(.30) 
Hispanic .11 (.32) 
.086 
(.28) 
.12 
(.33) 
.14 
(.35) 
Bachelors or 
Advanced 
Degree 
.31 
(.46) 
.30 
(.45) 
.30 
(.45) 
.31 
(.45) 
Union Member .03 (.18) 
.04 
(.19) 
.03 
(.18) 
.03 
(.18) 
Full Time 
Worker 
.80 
(.39) 
.81 
(.38) 
.81 
(.38) 
.81 
(.36) 
Unemployed .078 (.25) 
.064 
(.24) 
.041 
(.20) 
.053 
(.22) 
Employer ≥  
1,000 employees 
.45 
(.50) 
.41 
(.49) 
.47 
(.50) 
.45 
(.50) 
Household 
Income 
$68,070 
(53,590) 
$63,037 
(41,093) 
$67,877 
(57,337) 
$74,177 
(63,447) 
mtMergerHHI  
.2395 
(.17) 
.1909 
(.14) 
.2490 
(.17) 
.2783 
(.18) 
Number of 
HMOs 
7.90 
(4.00) 
5.11 
(3.17) 
10.1 
(4.3) 
7.63 
(3.43) 
N 467,136 32,532 31,253 52,160 
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 Table 3 
 
Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on HMO Premiums 
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)  
 
Dependent Variable is Logarithm of HMO Premium Variable Sample 
 Full Sample 
 
(1) 
1995 Mean 
Number 
HMOs 10 ≥
(2) 
1995 Mean 
Number 
HMOs 7 & 
HMOs <10 
≥
(3) 
1995 Mean 
Number 
HMOs <7 
(4) 
 
Log Hospital Merger 
HHI 
 
.0026 
(.0051) 
.085** 
(.030) 
-.043 
(.037) 
-.00071 
(.0098) 
Log Average 
Number of HMOs 
-.011 
(.020) 
.056 
(.038) 
.0020 
(.017) 
-.059 
(.034) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number HMOs 
.25 
.12 
3,345 
374 
.28 
.077 
1,435 
159 
.32 
.22 
875 
97 
.31 
.078 
1,035 
118 
Note: Right hand side variables include age of the HMO, mean HSA per capita income, mean HSA 
population, mean percent HSA with collage degree, mean HSA poverty rate, mean HSA hospital beds per 
capita, mean percent HSA over 64 years of age, mean HSA MDs per capita, mean HSA unemployment 
rate, mean HSA population density, mean HSA nurse wage, the mean distribution of employers across size 
categories, time trends interacted with HMO type and annual dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the 
HMO level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
 
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on 
 Probability of Private Health Insurance for MSA under 4,000,000 in population 
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)  
 
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance 
Sample 
Variable 
Full Sample 
 
(1) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  10≥
 
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  
&
6≥
10<  
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs 6<  
 
 (2) 
Merger HHI -.0073 (.024) 
-.16** 
(.049) 
.0015 
(.035) 
.040 
(.041) 
Log Number of 
HMOs 
.0011 
(.0024) 
-.0072 
(.0079) 
.018*
(.0080) 
-.0062 
(.0038) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number MSAs 
.25 
.25 
509,178 
250 
.25 
.24 
225,267 
57 
.25 
.25 
155,039 
74 
.24 
.24 
128,872 
119 
Right hand side variables include age, household income, household income squared, household income 
cubed, family size, household income per family member, indicators for race, Hispanic status, employment 
status, union status, marital status, high school graduate, college graduate, post-baccalaureate education, 
veteran status, household income interacted with martial status, household income interacted with female, 
time trend interacted with bottom decile of income distribution, time trend interacted with 2nd decile of 
income distribution, time trend interacted with fulltime work status, time trend interacted with household 
income, employer size indicators, occupational indicators, industry indicators, MSA per capita income, 
MSA population, percent MSA with collage degree, MSA hospital beds per capita, percent MSA over 64 
years of age, MSA MDs per capita, MSA unemployment rate, MSA hospital beds per capita and annual 
dummies.  Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5 
 
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on 
Probability of Any Health Insurance 
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)  
 
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Any Insurance 
Sample 
Variable 
Full Sample 
 
(1) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  10≥
 
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  
&
6≥
10<  
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs 6<  
 
 (2) 
Merger HHI -.0073 (.024) 
-.15** 
(.059) 
.0069 
(.050) 
.038 
(.040) 
Log Number of 
HMOs 
.00032 
(.0036) 
-.0091 
(.0062) 
.016 
(.0088) 
-.0055 
(.0040) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number MSAs 
.19 
.19 
509,178 
250 
.19 
.18 
225,267 
57 
.19 
.19 
155,039 
74 
.17 
.18 
128,872 
119 
Note: See Table 4 for list of control variables. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 6 
 
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on 
 Probability of Private or Any Health Insurance by Household Income  
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)  
 
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance 
Sample is 1995 Number of HMOs  10≥
 
Dependent Variable is Private 
Insurance 
Dependent Variable is Any 
Insurance 
Variable 
Household Income 
under  $60,000 
(1) 
Household Income 
above $60,000  
(2) 
Household Income 
under  $60,000 
(3) 
Household Income 
above $60,000 
(4)  
Merger HHI -.22
** 
(.079) 
-.051 
(.062) 
-.20** 
(.079) 
-.048 
(.056) 
Log Number of 
HMOs 
-.0038 
(.012) 
-.014 
(.0095) 
-.0029 
(.012) 
-.013 
(.0071) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number MSAs 
.19 
.16 
90,664 
57 
.13 
.14 
86,225 
57 
.17 
.16 
90,664 
57 
.13 
.13 
86,225 
57 
Note: See Table 4 for a list of controls variables. 
*Significant at the 5% level.  
**Significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 7 
 
Robustness Analysis 
MSA Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation  
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance 
Variable 
1995 
Number of 
HMOs  10≥
 
(1) 
1995 
Number of 
HMOs 12≥
 
(2) 
1995 
Number of 
HMOs 11≥
 
(3) 
1995 
Number of 
HMOs  9≥
 
 (4) 
1995 
Number of 
HMOs  8≥
 
 (5) 
Merger HHI -.17
*
(.070) 
-.24** 
(.065) 
-.24** 
(.051) 
-.12**
(.043) 
-.074*
(.036) 
Merger 
HHI(t+2) 
-.047 
(.057) --- --- --- --- 
Merger  
HHI (t-2) 
.10 
(.061) --- --- --- --- 
Log Number of 
HMOs 
-.0029 
(.012) 
.0089 
(.014) 
-.0031 
(.010) 
-.0073 
(.0068) 
-.017 
(.0045) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number MSAs 
.26 
.22 
132,273 
57 
.25 
.24 
99,873 
22 
.25 
.24 
161,077 
40 
.25 
.21 
247,575 
68 
.25 
.23 
308,984 
88 
Variable Dependent Variable is Indicator of Any Insurance 
Merger HHI -.17
*
(.065) 
-.27** 
(.087) 
-.23** 
(.058) 
-.11*
(.044) 
-.062 
(.037) 
Merger 
HHI(t+2) 
-.022 
(.067) --- --- --- --- 
Merger  
HHI (t-2) 
.083 
(.071) --- --- --- --- 
Log Number of 
HMOs 
-.022 
(.067) 
.0060 
(.010) 
.0015 
(.0090) 
-.0072 
(.0055) 
-.0025 
(.0059) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number MSAs 
.20 
.17 
132,273 
57 
.19 
.19 
99,873 
22 
.19 
.19 
161,077 
40 
.19 
.17 
247,575 
68 
.19 
.18 
308,984 
88 
Note: See Table 4 for a list of controls. 
*Significant at the 5% level.  
**Significant at the 1% level.  
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 Table 8 
 
Mean Annual Per-Member Premium and Mean Percentage  
Change in Premium Due to Hospital Mergers 
(Means weighted by HMO Enrollment) 
 
Year Annual Premium (2000 dollars) 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Premiums due to 
Hospital Mergers 
Across all HMOs 
Percentage Increase 
in Premiums due to 
Hospital Mergers 
For HMOs in 
“Competitive HMO 
Markets” 
1990 $1,488 -- -- 
1991 $1,584 .16 .26 
1992 $1,704 .33 .54 
1993 $1,716 .66 1.1 
1994 $1,728 1.2 2.1 
1995 $1,656 1.9 3.2 
1996 $1,524 2.2 3.8 
1997 $1,548 2.8 4.7 
1998 $1,584 3.0 5.1 
1999 $1,668 3.1 5.2 
2000 $1,752 3.2 5.4 
2001 $1,896 3.2 5.3 
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Table 9 
 
Estimated Impact of Hospital Mergers on Quantity of Health Insurance for US Civilian 
Adults  
 
Year 
25-65 
Civilian 
Population 
(millions) 
 
Private 
Health 
Insurance 
Rate 
Uninsurance 
Rate 
Estimated 
Change 
in Private 
Insurance 
Rate 
Estimated 
Change in 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Estimated 
Decrease 
in Private 
Insurance 
Roles 
Estimated 
Increase in 
Uninsured 
Population 
1990 126.3 .787 .182 -- -- -- -- 
1991 128.5 .778 .190 -.00017 .00016 21,845 20,560
1992 130.6 .771 .193 -.00032 .00030 41,792 39,180
1993 132.6 .756 .206 -.00075 .00070 99,450 92,820
1994 134.6 .773 .190 -.0014 .0013 188,440 174,980
1995 136.7 .786 .180 -.0026 .0024 355,420 328,080
1996 138.9 .783 .182 -.0030 .0028 416,700 388,920
1997 141.1 .781 .182 -.0040 .0037 564,400 522,070
1998 143.0 .777 .191 -.0045 .0042 643,500 600,600
1999 144.9 .780 .190 -.0047 .0045 681,030 652,050
2000 146.2 .789 .190 -.0048 .0047 701,760 687,140
2001 147.7 .793 .181 -.0050 .0044 738,500 649,880
2002 149.5 .802 .168 -.0047 .0044 702,650 657,800
2003 151.3 .789 .178 -.0046 .0043 695,980 650,590
Sum   5,851,467 5,464,670
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 Table 10 
 
Estimated Welfare Impact of Hospital Mergers 1990-2001 
 
Year 
Loss in Consumer 
Surplus 
($1,000) 
Per capita Loss in 
Consumer Surplus 
($) 
Total Dead 
Weight Loss 
($1,000) 
1990 --- --- --- 
1991 263,819 2.05 26 
1992 588,588 4.51 109 
1993 1,192,934 9.00 525 
1994 2,262,577 16.81 1,814 
1995 3,532,086 25.84 5,161 
1996 3,785,930 27.26 6,468 
1997 5,014,070 35.54 11,314 
1998 5,511,716 38.54 14,270 
1999 6,085,774 42.00 16,858 
2000 6,612,866 45.23 19,129 
2001 7,358,982 49.82 19,714 
Sum 42,209,342 296.60 95,388 
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Figure 1 
 
Mean Population-Weighted Hospital Concentration and  
Number of Horizontal Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions -- 1990-2003 
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Table A1 
 
Control Variables for HMO Premium and Insurance Take-up Analysis 
 
HMO Premium Control Variables Insurance Take-Up Control Variables 
HMO Variables HSA Variables Individual Variables MSA Variables 
HSA Penetration Rate 
Percent of 
Establishments with 50 
to 99 employees 
Age 
Age2
Female 
Percent FP Hospitals 
MDs per capita 
Hospital Beds per capita 
Log of enrollment 
Percent of 
Establishments with 50 
to 99 employees 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Log of MSA population 
Log of MSA per-capita 
Income 
Trend and Trend 
squared interacted with 
FP, IPA, Network, 
Mixed indicators 
Percent of 
Establishments with 100 
to 249 employees 
Black 
Asian 
Hispanic 
Unemployment Rate 
Percent of population 
with college degrees 
Log of HMO Age 
Percent of 
Establishments with 250 
to 499 employees 
Veteran Status 
Union Status 
Log of Family Size 
Trend interacted with 
1990 Hospital HHI 
 
Percent of 
Establishments with 500 
to 999 employees 
Household Income 
Household Income2 
Household Income3
 
 
Percent of 
Establishments with 
1,000 or more 
employees 
Household Income ×  
Married 
Household Income ×  
Female 
 
 Log of RN Wages 
Per-capita Household 
Income 
Bottom 10% Income ×  
trend 
 
 MDs per capita Bottom 20% Income ×  trend  
 Log of per capita income 
Indicators for 
Employer’s Size  
 Unemployment rate Educational Attainment Indicators  
 Poverty rate Work Status Indicator  
 Log of number of establishments 
Industry Indicators 
Occupation Indicators  
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Table A2 
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Mergers  
(system expansions not included) on  Probability of  
Private Health Insurance for MSA under 4,500,000 in population 
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)  
 
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance 
Sample 
Variable 
Full Sample 
 
(1) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  10≥
 
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  
&
6≥
10<  
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs 6<  
 
 (2) 
Merger HHI .0040 (.033) 
-.033 
(.098) 
-.035 
(.046) 
.032 
(.040) 
Log Number of 
HMOs 
.0011 
(.0039) 
-.0080 
(.0070) 
.018*
(.0071) 
-.0060 
(.0045) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number MSAs 
.25 
.25 
509,178 
250 
.25 
.23 
225,267 
57 
.25 
.25 
155,039 
74 
.24 
.24 
128,872 
119 
Dependent Variable is Indicator of  Any Insurance 
Sample 
Variable 
Full Sample 
 
(1) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  10≥
 
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs  
&
6≥
10<  
(2) 
1995 Number 
of HMOs 6<  
 
 (2) 
Merger HHI .022 (.029) 
.052 
(.12) 
-.010 
(.042) 
.037 
(.038) 
Log Number of 
HMOs 
.00026 
(.0028) 
-.0095 
(.0071) 
.016*
(.0080) 
-.0050 
(.0054) 
Within R2
Overall R2 
N 
Number MSAs 
.19 
.19 
509,178 
250 
.19 
.18 
225,267 
57 
.19 
.19 
155,039 
74 
.17 
.17 
128,872 
119 
Note: See Table 4 for list of control variables. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
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